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CASEBRIEFS
HITTING REWIND: THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN
TRUST UNDER AGREEMENT OF TAYLOR SIGNALS A MOVE AWAY
FROM MODERN DEVELOPMENTS OF TRUST LAW
BY REQUIRING MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS
FOR CORPORATE TRUSTEE REMOVAL
RYAN J. AHRENS*
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”1
I. THE WORLD CHANGES, BUT A TRUST DOES NOT: STATIC TRUSTS AND
THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING INDUSTRY PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR
DISSATISFIED TRUST BENEFICIARIES
History has shown that the human ability to predict is flawed—or at
best questionable.2 At times, we have spectacularly showcased our inability
to know what the future has in store; we have predicted that the Beatles
would never be popular, that online shopping would fail to appeal to the
average consumer, and, in 1929, that the American stock market would
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2016, Hillsdale College. This Casebrief is dedicated to my family and the
members of the Law Review, whose many hours of work and insightful comments
and edits made this Casebrief’s publication possible.
1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 80 (1975) (explaining, through
character Gavin Stevens, that though someone stated that Temple Drake is dead,
effects of those gone are still felt).
2. See, e.g., Caroline Beaton, Humans Are Bad at Predicting Futures That Don’t
Benefit Them, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/11/humans-are-bad-at-predicting-futures-that-dont-benefit-them/
544709/ [https://perma.cc/9W2P-LFNJ] (noting that optimistic people often
wrongly believe that “bad things are less likely to happen to them” and that this
“hampers their decision-making”); Steve Forbes, Romney Will Win Decisively, FORBES
(Nov. 6, 2012, 2:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2012/11/06/
steve-forbes-romney-will-win-decisively/#67d83c472398 [https://perma.cc/7HAYVEVJ] (predicting that Mitt Romney will win 2012 presidential election); Frances
Romero, Top 10 Failed Predictions, TIME (Oct. 21, 2011), http://content.time.com/
time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2097462_2097456_2097489,00.html
[https://perma.cc/X336-6GKL] (listing top ten failed predictions, including various end of world predictions, that Titanic cannot sink, and that earth is flat); Robert J. Szczerba, 15 Worst Tech Predictions of All Time, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2015, 7:55 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertszczerba/2015/01/05/15-worst-tech-predictions-of-all-time/#51e667d11299 [https://perma.cc/FRP4-ZVU7] (listing fifteen
worst technology predictions, including one prediction that stated telephone
would not become popular).
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not crash.3 It takes a skilled lawyer, then, to draft a trust that can simultaneously reflect and retain the wishes of the trust’s creator while having
enough flexibility to adapt to an ever-changing and crucially unpredictable
world.4 Dramatic ownership and organizational changes over the last century in banks and other financial institutions, for example, have challenged the old trust precept that even though the world has changed, a
trust should not.5 The stark dissonance between an unchanging trust document and an ever-changing banking industry has been subject to criticism, especially when the beneficiaries of a trust are otherwise unable to
amend an antiquated trust or remove unsatisfactory bank, or corporate
trustees.6
3. See Lucy Kinder, 7 of the Worst Predictions Ever, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 9,
2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/7-of-the-worst-predictions-ever2013-9 [https://perma.cc/4JE5-LY9B] (listing seven predictions that famously did
not come true).
4. See Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century:
The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697,
701 (2001) (“The most difficult reality that the drafter of a trust faces is that the
circumstances anticipated at drafting inevitably change over time.”); see also Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The Modification and
Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 237, 298 (2015) (explaining that multi-generational trusts are difficult to administer because of lack of
flexibility). One way to avoid this problem is to “[empower] the trustee or a trust
protector to modify the trust in response to changing circumstances.” See id. (explaining potential fix to inflexible trusts). For a general definition of a trust and
the process of its formation, see infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
5. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 243–44 (describing American doctrine in place
since late 1800s which states that trusts can only be terminated when all beneficiaries consent and material purpose of trust is either fulfilled or not violated);
Ronald Chester & Sarah R. Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform
Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of
Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 246 (2002) (“Dissolution, merger, and the selling
of trust accounts, with or without such corporate changes, certainly indicate that
bank trustees no longer regard their ‘contracts’ with the average settlor as sacrosanct.”); Standish H. Smith, Reforming the Corporate Administration of Personal Trusts The Problem and a Plan, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 563, 566 (2000) (noting that in
1940 and earlier, wealthy trust creators would use friends or “the trust department
of a local commercial bank” to administer trust). For the definition and a discussion of the Claflin doctrine, see infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
6. See Smith, supra note 5, at 569 (noting that beneficiaries of older trusts are
often locked in with trust’s corporate trustee); id. at 570 (describing survey results
that found that banks were unwilling to offer to beneficiaries “basic investing fundamentals” and “information on their rights, the responsibilities of a fiduciary and
explanations underlying their administrative actions.”); id. at 572 (“In practice, it is
clear that the broad powers granted to trustees can be abused. Even the beneficiary who serves as his/her own trustee may not always administer in the manner
intended by the settlor in which case there is a conflict of interest between beneficiary and settlor!”). Even state and federal law do not fully solve this problem:
In trusts, where the right to change the corporate fiduciary without having to prove cause is absent (which is typically the case for older trusts),
the corporate trustee is held in-check principally by a body of state and
federal law which is often non-specific and for practical purposes, inaccessible unless the beneficiary is willing to risk his/her trust assets in the
hope of relief.
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Discussions surrounding this problem are forced to grapple with how
to balance the oft-disparate interests between the person who created a
trust (the settlor) and those receiving the benefits of that trust (the beneficiaries).7 These discussions attempt to answer a difficult question: at what
point has the world changed enough where the wishes of the settlor—as
reflected in the trust document—should be modifiable by the trust’s beneficiaries?8 Indeed, for much of American history, trust beneficiaries had
limited powers to make any changes to a trust.9 In recent years, however,
reforms have increased beneficiary control to modify and amend a trust
document.10
In July 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Trust Under Agreement of Taylor11 denied three beneficiaries the ability to remove a corporate trustee by means of modifying their trust.12 Taylor is notable because
it falls at the intersection of the modern trend to afford more power to
Id. at 569 (explaining problem of difficult-to-oust corporate trustees and how current legal system may not solve it). For a definition and discussion of corporate
trustees, see infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
7. See Bradley S. Fogel, Terminating or Modifying Irrevocable Trusts by Consent of
the Beneficiaries - A Proposal to Respect the Primacy of the Settlor’s Intent, 50 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. L.J. 337, 341 (2016) (noting “a common conflict of interest in trusts and
estates” is between two competing desires: settlor’s desire to put property in trust
such that it can be controlled for a long period of time versus trust beneficiaries’
desire to use trust property in way they want).
8. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“If the interests of the deceased settlor
and the living trust beneficiaries sometimes diverge, then what is the proper balance to strike between them?”). See generally id. at 257–58 (describing trust modification theory of equitable deviation, which allows courts to make changes to trusts
that have been affected by extreme circumstances that settlor did not anticipate).
Equitable deviation is applied in a variety of scenarios, including, “removing a trustee, modifying a trust investment portfolio, or extending the duration of the trust.”
See id. at 258 (explaining that theory of equitable deviation has expanded beyond
“overrid[ing] restrictions on the sale of trust property”).
9. See Chester, supra note 4, at 719 (explaining that courts’ strict rules affording beneficiaries little power to terminate or modify trust was direct result of
courts’ acceptance of trusts as legal devices meant to protect property); Chester &
Ziomek, supra note 5, at 242–43 (“As Claflin indicates, American trust law traditionally has protected settlor intent more zealously than the interests of the beneficiaries.”). Indeed, Chester continues: “What good were the restraints imposed by
settlors if beneficiaries, according to their whim, could alter the trust containing
the restraints or eliminate them altogether by terminating the trust?” Chester,
supra note 4, at 719 (noting courts’ problems with broad beneficiary power to
modify or terminate trust). For a discussion of the treatment of trust modification
and termination in American and Pennsylvanian law, see infra notes 39–60 and
accompanying text.
10. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 263 (explaining that provisions in Uniform
Trust Code and Third Restatement of Trusts have “expanded the power of courts
to modify or terminate irrevocable trusts” and “chipped away at the traditional
scope of dead hand control over trust property, and significantly expanded the
rights of beneficiaries”). For a discussion of the Uniform Trust Code and its effect
on liberalizing American trust law, see infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
11. 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017).
12. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1149 (“[W]e conclude that the UTA does not permit the removal and replacement of a trustee without Orphans’ Court approval in

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 3

694

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: p. 691

beneficiaries to make changes to a trust, including changing its trustee,
and the problem of intimidating corporate trustees that are too difficult to
oust.13 Specifically, the Taylor court denied the beneficiaries the ability to
modify their trust to include a provision that would grant them the future
power to remove their corporate trustee.14 In its reasoning, the court
stated that trust modification and trustee removal are distinct issues governed by separate provisions of Pennsylvania trust law.15 By placing trustee removal beyond the scope of the general power to modify a trust, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania signaled its apprehension to grant beneficiaries the plenary power to use trust modification to effectuate any goal
(in this case, trustee removal).16 However, concerns remain regarding
beneficiaries’ limited powers to remove a corporate trustee whose performance is unsatisfactory.17
This Casebrief argues that Taylor: (1) limits trustee removal to Section
7766 of Pennsylvania’s trust law, which includes its own internal limitations on corporate trustee removal; (2) calls attention to growing criticism
that the power dynamic between corporate trustees and beneficiaries is
inequitable; and (3) requires Pennsylvania practitioners to examine other
means, such as a 2013 Pennsylvania Superior Court case, for dissatisfied
beneficiaries to free themselves of their corporate trustees.18 Part II inaccordance with section 7766. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s
decision.”).
13. See id. at 1154 (describing beneficiaries’ arguments that they should be
able to replace corporate trustee via trust modification because banking industry
has changed dramatically since date of trust’s creation); Ausness, supra note 4, at
271 (stating that Restatement (Third) of Trusts allows for termination or modification of irrevocable trusts even if material purpose is violated, “if a court determines
that the reasons for the proposed modification outweigh the material purpose”);
Smith, supra note 5, at 571 (“[A] corporate trustee is not only responsible to its
stockholders and must maximize profits, but may not even have been known to the
settlor due to merger, etc.”).
14. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1155 (holding lower court was in error and modification/termination Section 7740.1 of Pennsylvania trust law cannot be used to add
portability provision that would enable trust beneficiaries, at some future point, to
remove corporate trustee).
15. See id. at 1156–57 (“[C]urrently the corporate trustee of the Taylor Trust
may be removed and replaced, if at all, only pursuant to section 7766, the statutory
default provision for removal and replacement.”).
16. See id. at 1157 (holding that trustee removal cannot be effectuated via
trust modification provision by stating that allowing otherwise would “nullify, exclude or cancel” more stringent requirements found in trustee removal section).
17. See Smith, supra note 5, at 569 (“Consider a service which the consumer
must accept and pay for even if unsatisfactory and for which the fee is typically set
by the vendor rather than by market forces.”).
18. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766(b) (West 2010) (listing requirements that petition to remove trustee must meet for court to be able to find
that trustee removal is appropriate); Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1161 (holding that section
7766 is exclusive provision for trustee removal in Pennsylvania); Smith, supra note
5, at 565–66 (explaining how beneficiaries “often complain” about corporate trustees, including “high rate of turnover of trust officers and their lack of experience
and expertise”); id. at 569 (noting how corporate beneficiaries set fees without
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cludes a brief explanation of the law of trusts and an overview of another
Pennsylvania trust case that addressed no-fault corporate trustee removal.19 Part III provides the facts and procedure of Taylor before it
reached the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.20 Part IV describes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Taylor.21 Part V discusses how
the Taylor decision has limited trustee removal to Section 7766 of the
UTA—which includes its own limitations for corporate trustee removal—
and that legal scholars are concerned about the unequal footing between
corporate trustees and trust beneficiaries.22 Part VI discusses the impact
Taylor could have on Pennsylvania practitioners and introduces another
Pennsylvania case that may be more useful to trust beneficiaries who wish
to rid themselves of their corporate trustee.23
II. SOME THINGS NEVER CHANGE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST LAW
HAVE REMAINED THE SAME WHILE U.S. AND PENNSYLVANIA
TREATMENT OF TRUST MODIFICATION HAVE EBBED
AND FLOWED
An in-depth discussion of trusts requires an understanding of a number of related terms and legal concepts whose meanings may not be intuitive to someone unfamiliar with this area of the law.24 In its most basic
form, a trust is a separation of title of property between three legally distinct parties: the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary.25 The formation
beneficiary consent and that challenging corporate trustee’s status as trustee could
deplete money from trust); id. at 575 (“In short, the corporate trustee can and
sometimes does exploit its monopolistic position in order to restrain its clients.
Consequently, beneficiaries frustrated by incompetent investment management,
rising fee rates, and an ever changing stream of often less than expert account
administrators, typically choose to endure rather than confront.”); Jeffrey Marshall, Trust Beneficiaries Use “No-Fault” law to Replace Trustee, MARSHALL, PARKER &
WEBER, LLC (June 7, 2013), http://www.paelderlaw.com/trust-beneficiaries-useno-fault-law-to-replace-trustee/ [https://perma.cc/Z6G8-TDNY] (explaining that
“it is getting easier for beneficiaries to change the trustee” as result of McKinney
decision). For a discussion of McKinney, see infra notes 61–70, 144–155 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the legal structure of a trust, corporate trustees, and trust legislation in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 24–70 and accompanying
text.
20. For a further discussion of the facts and procedure surrounding Taylor,
see infra notes 71–91 and accompanying text.
21. For a full narrative analysis of Taylor, see infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text.
22. For a full critical analysis of Taylor, see infra notes 106–40 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion on the impact Taylor could have on Pennsylvania
practitioners and what they can do to work around it, see infra notes 141–55 and
accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of trusts, including related terms and their definitions,
see infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
25. See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining trust by
describing relationship between three distinct legal parties).
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of a trust follows a general pattern: a person (the settlor) requests certain
property that he or she owns to be held by another (the trustee) in order
to benefit a third party (the beneficiary).26 Trustees, while holding legal
title to the property, are bound by the terms of the trust document and
must, according to the trust’s terms, distribute the trust property to the
beneficiary, who is deemed to hold equitable title.27
A.

Old Relics: Corporate Trustees Stand the Test of Time Because of Strict
Requirements to Amend Irrevocable Trusts

Trusts are popular legal devices because they allow control over assets
even after the death of the settlor.28 In addition, trusts are ubiquitous
because they are extremely versatile, appearing in many different forms
that are primarily distinguished by their purpose; examples of specific
trusts range from annuity trusts, to constructive trusts, to testamentary
trusts.29 While there are many kinds of specific types of trusts, at a
broader level most trusts can fit into two major categories: irrevocable or
revocable.30 Settlors wishing to instill permanence in their trust would
make the trust irrevocable, meaning that, for the most part, after the
26. See id. (explaining formation of trust as related to three distinct legal parties). “Settlor” is defined as, “[s]omeone who makes a settlement of property; esp.,
one who sets up a trust.” Settlor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining settlor). “Trustee” is defined as, “[s]omeone who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal title to property, holds it in
trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary.” Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining trustee). “Beneficiary” is
defined as, “[s]omeone who is designated to receive . . . as a result of a legal arrangement or instrument.” Beneficiary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining beneficiary).
27. See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that settlor
vests in trustee legal title to property while beneficiary has right, “solely in equity,”
to enjoy that property, and that trustee has fiduciary duties, outlined specifically by
settlor, to deal with property for beneficiary’s benefit).
28. See Chester, supra note 4, at 698–99 (explaining trusts and their ability to
aid those intent on “projecting vast wealth past their own deaths”).
29. See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (providing extensive
list of different types of trusts). An annuity trust is defined as, “[a] trust from
which the trustee must pay a sum certain annually to one or more beneficiaries for
their respective lives or for a term of years . . . .” See id. (defining annuity trust as
subset of “trust” definition). A constructive trust is defined as, “[a]n equitable
remedy by which a court recognizes that a claimant has a better right to certain
property than the person who has legal title to it.” See id. (defining constructive
trust as subset of “trust” definition). A testamentary trust is defined as, “[a] trust
that is created by a will and takes effect when the settlor (testator) dies.” See id.
(defining testamentary trust as subset of “trust” definition).
30. See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that most
states’ default rules make trust irrevocable if trust document is silent as to that
matter); see also Scott M. McCullough, Uncovering the Potential of an Irrevocable Trust,
28 UTAH B.J. 36, 36 (2015) (noting that “with few exceptions and creating tools,
[irrevocable trusts] cannot be changed or altered once established”).
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trust’s creation it cannot be terminated—even by the settlor.31 A revocable trust, by contrast, is much more amendable.32
Trustees, either individuals or companies, are crucial to the administration of a trust.33 If a trust has a corporate trustee, then a business
(likely a bank or trust company) has filled the role of trustee in lieu of an
individual person.34 Moreover, even at the beginning of the rise of the
trust’s popularity as a device for wealth planning, settlors used corporate
trustees.35 This longstanding use of banks as corporate trustees has effectuated interconnectedness between the banking industry and the law of
trusts, and this relationship continues to embroil the industry in criticism.36 For example, older trusts deal with the effects of having a corporate trustee that, through years of mergers and reorganizations, no longer
resembles the corporate trustee as designated by the trust’s settlor.37 If a
beneficiary is unhappy with the trust’s corporate trustee, he or she may try
31. See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining irrevocable
trust as subset of “trust” definition and explaining that irrevocable trust, upon creation, cannot be terminated by its settlor).
32. See id. (defining revocable trust as “trust in which the settlor reserves the
right to terminate the trust and recover the trust property and any undistributed
income”).
33. See Smith, supra note 5, at 571 (noting differences between corporate
trustees and individual trustees). In theory, a trustee is supposed to represent the
wishes of the settlor because the settlor has relinquished ownership of the property. See id. at 572 (“In theory, a trustee of a personal trust represents the interests
of the settlor and, derivatively, those of the beneficiaries. In theory, the trustee
stands in the shoes of the settlor.”).
34. See Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “corporate
trustee” as part of “trustee” definition).
35. See Smith, supra note 5, at 564 (describing banking industry’s long-standing involvement in “evolution of the Uniform Trust Act”). In fact, the banking
industry first suggested that there should be model and uniform rules of trust administration. See id. (quoting Uniform Trusts Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (Sept. 1937)) (noting banking industry’s
interest in promulgating more favorable rules to ease their trust administration
duties). For a discussion of the interconnectedness of the banking industry and
the law of trusts, see infra notes 36–37, 130–34 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 567 (“The bank trustee can act with more
impunity than his predecessor because the typical trust department has numerically more clients than before (the corpus for each representing a diminished percentage of total assets handled), and for the most part, his clients do not know one
another.”). Corporate trustees can also be questioned about where their loyalty
lies: to the settlor (by following the terms of the trust), or to their shareholders (by
making a profit from the trust)? See id. at 571 (explaining tension between duties
owed to shareholders and duties owed to settlor and beneficiary). In addition,
corporate trustees control what they will be paid by the trust as reimbursement to
administration, often while helpless beneficiaries can do nothing more than watch
because the trust lacks a portability clause. See id. at 572 (explaining unilateral
control over fee arrangements by corporate trustees while trust beneficiaries often
remain helpless to “[seek] more cost effective administration”).
37. See id. at 566–67 (explaining how corporate trustees of older trusts undergo mergers and acquisitions that may render corporate trustee unrecognizable
and of character different than intended by settlor).
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to modify the trust to add a “portability” provision—a trust provision that
gives a person the power to change the trustee.38
Even irrevocable trusts can be modified or terminated.39 As the modifier may suggest, however, modifying or terminating irrevocable trusts is
still considered a difficult task.40 Notably, treatment of irrevocable trust
termination or modification has ebbed and flowed throughout American
history: old common law based on English treatment of trusts made the
process quite easy, then a famous Massachusetts case limited this broad
power, and then today, with the promulgation of model acts and trust law
reform, this termination and modification power has again expanded.41
The seminal Massachusetts case, Claflin v. Claflin,42 only allowed trust termination if both prongs of a test were satisfied: (1) all beneficiaries consent to the termination, and (2) the “material purpose” of the trust is
“fulfilled or is impossible.”43 Courts have adapted the Claflin test from its
38. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 242 (defining “portability” as power
to change trustee and explaining how courts have viewed this power as a type of
trust modification); id. at 275 (placing portability at end of spectrum representing
strong beneficiary power over removal of trustee).
39. See Fogel, supra note 7, at 338 (“Beneficiaries frequently seek to terminate
or modify purportedly irrevocable trusts that, they feel, do not serve their needs.”).
Trusts can be terminated for a variety of reasons, including the trust document
giving the authority for it to be terminated, to correct a mistake, or because the
value of the trust assets is too low. See id. at 339 (listing common reasons as to how
or why trusts are terminated).
40. See id. at 340 (“Indeed, in most states it is exceedingly difficult to terminate, or modify, an irrevocable trust.”).
41. See id. (explaining how early U.S. trust cases followed law of England,
which vested in trust beneficiary broad power to terminate trust); id. (explaining
how Massachusetts case, Claflin, introduced new test on trust termination modification with more stringent requirements); see also Prefatory Note, UNIFORM TRUST
CODE (2000), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust_code/utc_final_
rev2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/78MC-TVY7] (explaining how Uniform Trust
Code, written in 2000, includes number of “innovative provisions” such as “rules
on trust modification and termination that will enhance flexibility”). English law
can be viewed as more strongly considering the interests of the trust beneficiaries
rather than the interests of the settlor. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 253
(explaining difference of approach in English law, which has liberal trust modification rules that includes consideration of beneficiaries’ interests in trust modification analysis). For a discussion of the Uniform Trust Code and its connection to
Pennsylvania’s trust law, see infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
42. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
43. See Fogel, supra note 7, at 340 (stating how Claflin spurred development of
new common law test for modification or termination of trust). Notably, Claflin
never used the phrase “material purpose,” yet that language made its way into this
new common law test. See id. at 346 (noting language of common law test differs
from language Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used in Claflin decision). Indeed, Claflin’s power is undeniable; a prominent reason that the American legal
system is so hesitant to liberalize trust modification and agreement stems back to
Claflin’s rule. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 242 (“The principal reason
for this reluctance lies in the tenet announced in Claflin preventing trust termination (or, by implication, modification) where such changes contravene a material
purpose of the settlor.”). In Claflin, the settlor created a testamentary trust for his
sons (the beneficiaries). See Claflin, 20 N.E. at 455 (explaining origin of trust).
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original applicability to trust termination to also encompass trustee modification.44 The kinds of powers beneficiaries should have regarding trust
modification, and whether Claflin remains the proper test courts should
use, remains a subject of debate today.45
B.

Letting Go of the Past: Pennsylvania Updates its Strict Trust Modification
Statute Through the Enactment of the Uniform Trust Act

Before substantial reform in the early twenty-first century, Pennsylvania had a longstanding practice of strictly enforcing settlor intent (as
expressed in the trust document) in petitions to modify or terminate a
trust.46 For example, if a trust’s settlor was dead and all beneficiaries
wanted to terminate or amend a spendthrift trust, it was impermissible
The trust document made clear that the trustee should pay one of the beneficiaries (Adelbert) in a specific manner: $10,000 at the age of twenty-one and
$10,000 at the age of twenty-five. See id. (explaining instructions in trust document
on how specific beneficiary was to be paid). Before he turned twenty-five, the beneficiary whose payment had these strings attached petitioned the court to be paid
the remaining $10,000, but the court refused. See id. at 455–56 (refusing to grant
beneficiary’s request for premature release of trust funds). The court noted that,
“[t]he existing situation is one which the testator manifestly had in mind, and
made provision for. The strict execution of the trust has not become impossible;
the restriction upon the plaintiff’s possession and control is, we think, one that the
testator had a right to make . . . .” Id. (explaining beneficiaries’ request and
court’s general reasoning for denying it).
44. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 256 (explaining that Claflin has come to apply
to both trust termination and modification).
45. See Fogel, supra note 7, at 349 (describing dueling views of “freedom of
disposition” and “professed interests of . . . beneficiaries”); Chester & Ziomek,
supra note 5, at 247 (suggesting that Claflin doctrine may be “too restrictive of
beneficiaries’ rights to play the corporate fiduciary market”); see also id. at 275 (arguing that whatever solution is proposed to solve inequality of power between corporate trustees and beneficiaries, it must strike a balance “between easy portability
. . . and the interests of [the settlor] . . . in establishing the trust deal”).
46. See In re Western Pennsylvania National Bank, 225 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa.
1967) (“It has long been the well established law in Pennsylvania that a testator’s
intent is the polestar in interpreting a will.”); Clark v. Clark, 191 A.2d 417, 420–21
(Pa. 1963) (“No principle in the law of wills and trusts is more firmly and clearly
established than that the intention of the testator or settlor must prevail.”) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was rather unsympathetic to
beneficiaries simply unhappy with their trustee, requiring in one case that the beneficiaries show a violation of some fiduciary duty. See In re White, 484 A.2d 763,
765–66 (Pa. 1984) (refusing to remove trustee, even though beneficiaries were
unhappy with trustee, because no fiduciary duty was violated). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in In re Burleigh outlined the Pennsylvania “hornbook law”
regarding settlor primacy as it stood in 1961:
It is now hornbook law (1) that the testator’s intent is the polestar and
must prevail; and (2) that his intent must be gathered from a consideration of (a) all the language contained in the four corners of his will and
(b) his scheme of distribution and (c) the circumstances surrounding
him at the time he made his will and (d) the existing facts; and (3) that
technical rules or canons of construction should be resorted to only if the
language of the will is ambiguous or conflicting or the testator’s intent is
for any reason uncertain. . . .
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under older Pennsylvania law.47 The same strictness applied to trustee
removal; to successfully petition to remove a trustee, Pennsylvania courts
generally required some proof of fault on the part of the trustee.48 Courts
justified this high bar of trustee removal by rooting its analysis in settlor
intent—if the settlor chose a particular trustee, the courts reasoned that
that decision should be respected.49
In 2006, however, Pennsylvania saw a dramatic change in its trust law
with the enactment of the Uniform Trust Act (UTA).50 Pennsylvania practitioners noted that this was a major shift in the law, with many firms issuing notices to their clients or fellow practitioners about the changed law
and its important effects.51 Pennsylvania based the UTA off of the UniSee In re Burleigh, 175 A.2d 838, 839 (Pa. 1961) (outlining Pennsylvania treatment
of settlor intent in trust interpretation).
47. See In re Bosler’s Estate, 107 A.2d 443, 445–46 (Pa. 1954) (holding that
without settlor consent, a spendthrift trust cannot be terminated even if all beneficiaries agree). A “spendthrift trust” is, “[a] trust that prohibits the beneficiary’s
interest from being assigned and also prevents a creditor from attaching that interest; a trust by the terms of which a valid restraint is imposed on the voluntary or
involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.” See Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “spendthrift trust” under main definition of trust).
48. See In re Mathues’s Estate, 185 A. 768, 769 (Pa. 1936) (holding that hostility between trustee and beneficiaries was not provoked by trustee and therefore
did not warrant removal of trustee); In re Hurley’s Estate, 169 A.81, 82 (Pa. 1933)
(holding that “personal antagonism” not enough to warrant removal of trustee); In
re Neafie’s Estate, 49 A. 129, 132 (Pa. 1901) (“If any personal annoyance or discomfort arises in her business relations with the trustee, it is to be regretted; but, so far
as the testimony discloses, he is not responsible for it, and should not be punished
by dismissal from his trust.”).
49. See Neafie, 49 A. at 130 (holding that settlor chose trustee for a reason and
court should try to honor that decision by not removing trustee “at mere whim or
caprice of the beneficiary”); see also Mathues, 185 A. at 769 (affirming holding in
Neafie that “there must be a substantial reason before the court will remove a trustee, who enjoyed the confidence of the person who created the trust”); In re Bailey’s Estate, 159 A. 549, 551 (Pa. 1932) (“It is a serious matter to dismiss trustees
appointed by will; much more should be shown by those who wish them dismissed
than would be the case where the trustees are appointed by the court.”).
50. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7701 (West 2010) (naming new
legislation governing Pennsylvania trust law as “Uniform Trust Act”). Pennsylvania
adopted this new for a variety of reasons: to make the law more accessible and
easier to find to make Pennsylvania trust law easier to work with when dealing with
trust relationships that span more than one state, to increase the law’s uniformity,
and, generally, to “improve the law.” See Thomas Work, An Organized Trust Statute
for Pennsylvania: Introduction to the Uniform Trust Act, PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROBATE AND
TR. LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBA
ReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/ProbateTrustSeptember2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8BB-LXVF] (explaining major reasons why
Pennsylvania adopted UTA in place of old Pennsylvania trust law).
51. See Pennsylvania Law of Trusts Commentary: Revolution or Evolution? Pennsylvania’s New Uniform Trust Act, K&L GATES (Jan. 2007), http://www.klgates.com/
pennsylvania-law-of-trusts-commentary-revolution-or-evolution—pennsylvaniasnew-uniform-trust-act-01-09-2007/ [https://perma.cc/L97G-U26E] (explaining in
“private clients alert” existence of new Pennsylvania trust law and major changes in
new law); The Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act, NAUMAN SMITH (Oct. 19, 2006),

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss4/3

10

Ahrens: Hitting Rewind: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Trust Under

2018]

CASEBRIEFS

701

form Trust Code (UTC), a model code written by the Uniform Law Commission.52 The Uniform Law Commission stated that it created the UTC
to provide national uniformity to trust law and create a number of “innovative provisions.”53
As a comprehensive piece of trust legislation, Pennsylvania’s UTA explicitly governs both trustee removal and trust modification/termination
for irrevocable trusts.54 Section 7740.1(b) of the UTA broadly allows trust
modification and termination; it states that, “[a] noncharitable irrevocable
trust may be modified upon the consent of all the beneficiaries only if the
court concludes that the modification is not inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust,” and that “[a] noncharitable irrevocable trust may be
terminated upon consent of all the beneficiaries only if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust.”55 Section 7766 of the UTA focuses just on
trustee removal and outlines the circumstances in which a court may remove a trustee; it states that,
https://www.nssh.com/2006/10/the-pennsylvania-uniform-trust-act/ [https://
perma.cc/JS5M-PD9N] (notifying clients of new Pennsylvania trust law); Work,
supra note 50 (giving general overview of Uniform Trust Act for Philadelphia area
practitioners).
52. See, e.g., 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7701 (referencing UTC
counterpart Section 101 in title of Section 7701). To promote national uniformity
of legislation, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) has promulgated various
model acts to simplify and stabilize various areas of law. See About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=about
%20the%20ULC [https://perma.cc/FV89-2L8K] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (“The
Uniform Law Commission . . . established in 1892, provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to
critical areas of state statutory law.”). As it stands, thirty-one states (plus Washington, D.C.) have adopted some form of the Uniform Trust Code, with Illinois having introduced UTC-based legislation this year. See Trust Code, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION (2018), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trust%20Code
[https://perma.cc/8TT2-JN49] (displaying map of states whose trust laws are
based off UTC or whose state legislatures have introduced legislation based off
UTC).
53. See Prefatory Note, UNIFORM TRUST CODE (2000), http://www.uniformlaws.
org/shared/docs/trust_code/utc_final_rev2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7UWCXGC] (explaining how Uniform Trust Code, written in 2000, includes number of
“innovative provisions” such as “rules on trust modification and termination that
will enhance flexibility”).
54. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766 (providing procedure and
four different scenarios in which court may order removal of current trustee); see
also id. § 7740.1 (allowing for modification or termination of “noncharitable irrevocable trust by consent” if certain conditions are met).
55. See id. § 7740.1(b) (outlining requirements for irrevocable trust modification when settlor is dead). Section 7740.1 also allows for irrevocable trust modification without court approval and in contravention of the trust’s material purpose
if all the beneficiaries and the settlor consent. See id. § 7740.1(a) (allowing modification or termination of irrevocable trust without court approval and in contravention of trust’s material purpose if settlor and all beneficiaries consent).
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[a] court may remove a trustee if it finds that removal of the
trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust
and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, a
suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available and: (1) the
trustee has committed a serious breach of trust; (2) lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs the administration
of the trust; (3) the trustee has not effectively administered the
trust because of the trustee’s unfitness, unwillingness or persistent failures; or (4) there has been a substantial change of
circumstances.56
While Section 7766 allows for no-fault trustee removal under a substantial change of circumstances in Section 7766(b)(4), in that same subsection the statute explicitly bars classifying mergers or reorganizations as
a substantial change of circumstances (mergers exception).57
In addition, courts wishing to interpret these sections of Pennsylvania’s UTA must do so via Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act
(Construction Act).58 In guiding a court’s analysis, the Construction Act
mandates that a court first look to the language of the statute to discern
the meaning of the statute.59 Only when the statute is “not explicit or [is]
ambiguous” may the court apply other canons of statutory construction.60

56. See id. § 7766 (giving court authority to remove trustee under limited circumstances). In addition, Section 7766 leaves the court with the power to remove
the trustee independent of any beneficiary petition. See id. (allowing for independent court intervention to remove trustee).
57. See id. § 7766(b)(4) (“A corporate reorganization of an institutional trustee, including a plan of merger or consolidation, is not itself a substantial change
of circumstances.”).
58. See 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1901 (West 1972) (“In the construction of the statutes of this Commonwealth, the rules set forth in this chapter
shall be observed, unless the application of such rules would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly.”).
59. See id. (explaining first step—as imposed by the Construction Act—is to
simply look at plain language of statute to try to discern meaning). The Construction Act—referenced to by the court—specifically states, “[w]hen the words of a
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” See id. § 1921(b) (imposing rule that
plain language of statute normally controls interpretation of such statute).
60. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155 (Pa. 2017) (citing 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (West 1972); Nardone v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 744 (Pa.
2015); Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1186–87 (Pa. 2014)
(explaining that the Construction Act and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case law
support proposition that plain language controls interpretation of statute unless
such statute is deemed to be ambiguous).
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Times are Changing: Superior Court Broadens Ability of Pennsylvania
Trustees to Remove Corporate Trustee through No-Fault Provision
of Section 7766

A recent Pennsylvania case, In re McKinney,61 has challenged the notion that Section 7766(b)(4) (the no-fault trustee removal provision)
strictly bars consideration of a corporate trustee’s merger or reorganization if a removal petition is based on a “substantial change of circumstances.”62 In that case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that
when a corporate trustee has undergone a “string of mergers” and the
beneficiaries of the trust moved to a different state, a substantial change of
circumstances had occurred and thus Section 7766(d) was satisfied.63 In
McKinney, the trustees petitioned a Pennsylvania court to remove the current corporate trustee of one of two trusts (both of which they were beneficiaries of), asserting a substantial change in circumstances.64
In its analysis, the court noted that the Pennsylvania General Assembly marked Section 7766 to indicate that it was based off its corresponding
section in the UTC.65 Due to the section’s connection to the UTC, the
court examined other states’ analyses of this trustee removal section and
found that they “uniformly” compared the current corporate trustee and
the proposed trustee when considering the merits of removing the current
trustee.66 The court also noted that while the settlor’s choice of trustee is
normally given high deference, this degree of deference changes when a
61. 67 A.3d 824 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
62. Compare 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766(b)(4) (barring trustee
removal on grounds of substantial change in circumstances if change in circumstance is only different corporate trustee vis a vis mergers or acquisitions), with
McKinney, 67 A.3d at 836 (holding that “string of mergers” can be factor court
considers in allowing trustee removal under Section 7766(b)(4)).
63. See McKinney, 67 A.3d at 836 (“After careful consideration, we find under
the circumstances of this case that a string of mergers over several years, resulting
in the loss of trusted bank personnel, coupled with the movement of a family from
Pennsylvania to Virginia, constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.”).
64. See id. at 827 (explaining why beneficiaries petitioned court and what they
claimed warranted corporate trustee removal). The trust in question did not originally include a portability provision, which would have allowed easier removal of
the corporate trustee. See id. at 826 (explaining lack of portability provision in
original trust document). The beneficiaries requested the removal of the corporate trustee so the two trusts (of which they were beneficiaries) could share a single
corporate trustee. See id. at 828 (explaining reasons stated by beneficiaries as to
why they wanted to remove corporate trustee from trust).
65. See id. at 831 (“Section 7766 is marked as a section that was based upon
the UTC, to which the UTC comments are applicable.”).
66. See id. (citing Rapela v. Green, 289 P.3d 428, 435 (Utah 2012)); Davis v.
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); In re Fleet Nat.
Bank’s Appeal from Prob., 837 A.2d 785, 797 (Conn. 2004) (noting that states such
as Connecticut, Missouri, and Utah have found that “implicit in the best interest
analysis is comparison between the current trustee and the proposed successor
trustee”).
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trust has a corporate trustee rather than an individual trustee.67 The
court concluded, in part, that a court should consider a variety of factors
when deciding if a change in trustee would be in the best interests of the
beneficiaries: the relationship of the trustee with the beneficiaries, the
trustee’s knowledge of the trust and the beneficiaries’ financial status, and
whether the trustee is convenient for the beneficiaries.68 Crucially, the
court concluded that while mergers or corporate reorganizations by themselves do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances (because of
the explicit mergers exception in Section 7766(b)(4)), a “string of mergers” that resulted in a “loss of trusted bank personnel,” coupled with the
out-of-state move of the beneficiaries constituted a substantial change in
circumstances.69 Thus, the trustee removal was granted.70
67. See id. at 835 (noting that while removal of settlor’s choice of individual
trustee would be “drastic,” in facts of McKinney corporate trustee has undergone
more than six mergers and is thus “farther removed from the original trustee”).
68. See id. at 833 (concluding that in analyzing whether current or proposed
trustee best serves beneficiaries’ interests, various factors should be included in
analysis). The court’s test in full is quite lengthy:
We conclude that courts should consider the following factors when determining whether a current trustee or a proposed successor trustee best
serves the interests of the beneficiaries: personalization of service; cost of
administration; convenience to the beneficiaries; efficiency of service;
personal knowledge of trusts’ and beneficiaries’ financial situations; location of trustee as it affects trust income tax; experience; qualifications;
personal relationship with beneficiaries; settlor’s intent as expressed in
the trust document; and any other material circumstances.
Id. (citing Rapela, 289 P.3d at 435–36; Davis, 243 S.W.3d at 430–31; In re Fleet Nat.
Bank’s Appeal from Prob., 837 A.2d at 797 n.17; Fleet Bank v. Foote, No.
CV020087512S, 2003 WL 22962488, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003)) (listing
factors to consider in beneficiaries’ interest test).
69. See id. at 836–37 (holding that multiple bank mergers resulting in change
in bank personnel plus out-of-state move of beneficiaries constituted substantial
change in circumstances under section 7766(b)(4)). The court specifically noted
the “change in character” of the trustee services after the corporate trustee went
through a merger. See id. (noting change in service after certain bank officers
stopped working for corporate trustee after merger occurred). Generally, the
court noted that the corporate trustee’s “trust administration services” had “declined.” See id. at 837 (noting drop in quality of service from corporate trustee).
70. See id. (holding that trial court erred in denying trustee removal). Firms
in Pennsylvania noted that the McKinney decision seemed to expand beneficiaries’
ability to remove their corporate trustee through Section 7766’s no-fault provision.
See Lee R. Allman & Dean A. Walters, Free Agent Season Open for Pennsylvania Trust
Beneficiaries, PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROBATE AND TR. LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER (July 16,
2013), http://www.philadelphiatrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FreeAgent-Season-Open-for-PA-Trust-Beneficiaries-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39YAHLE] (arguing that McKinney balances power between corporate trustees and
beneficiaries); Charles J. Avalli, New Way to Remove Trustee, GENTILE, HOROHO &
AVALLI, P.C. (Sept. 2016), http://gha-lawfirm.com/new-way-to-remove-trustee/
[https://perma.cc/4WWP-QH9B] (noting that, because of McKinney, beneficiaries
have gained power in ability to control their trusts); Marshall, supra note 18 (noting that McKinney decision makes it easier for beneficiaries to remove their
trustee).
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The Taylor controversy began almost 100 years before its beneficiaries
ended up at the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when, in 1928, Edward
Winslow Taylor created a trust (Taylor Trust).71 At the time of its formation, the purpose of the Taylor Trust was to care for Edward Winslow Taylor’s daughter, Anna Taylor Wallace.72 Initially, Taylor named Colonial
Trust Company “or its successors” as the trust’s corporate trustee.73
Within ten years of the trust’s creation, Taylor amended it twice: once in
1928, shortly after its creation, and once in 1930.74 By the 1930 amendment, Colonial Trust Company (the original corporate trustee) had already merged into a new corporation, which was subsequently recognized
by Taylor in the 1930 amendment.75
The Taylor Trust’s broad purpose was to provide “care” for Anna Taylor Wallace and her children.76 Fittingly, the terms dictating the trustee
duties were also broad, with the corporate trustee retaining wide discretion in distributing the trust income to Anna Taylor Wallace.77 Taylor
71. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Pa. 2017) (explaining formation of trust at center of Taylor case, including its almost 100-year
duration). For a more in-depth discussion of Sections 7766 and 7740.1 of Pennsylvania’s UTC, see supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
72. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1150 (explaining general purpose of trust was to
take care of Taylor’s daughter and her children that were alive at time of trust’s
creation).
73. See id. (explaining Taylor’s designation of trust’s corporate trustee). The
Taylor Trust had, for much of its duration, a corporate and personal trustee; at the
time of Taylor’s death in 1939, Anna Wallace Taylor became co-trustee, executing
her trustee duties alongside the corporate trustee. See id. (detailing when Anna
Taylor Wallace became co-trustee of Taylor Trust). Anna Wallace Taylor remained
co-trustee until her death in 1971, at which point her son, Frank R. Wallace, became co-trustee until his death in 2008. See id. (outlining succession of personal
trustees). For an explanation of a corporate trustee and how it differs from personal trustee, see supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
74. See id. (identifying two modifications made to trust by settlor after trust’s
1929 creation). The original trust document from 1928 allowed the corporate
trustee to use all of the principal to benefit Taylor’s daughter, but the 1930 trust
document modification scaled back this power and only allowed the corporate
trustee to distribute the trust’s income. See id. at 1150–51 (explaining notable
changes made to Taylor Trust in 1930). In addition, the 1930 trust document
modification removed an arbitration provision found in the original trust document. See id. at 1151 (noting elimination of arbitration provision that Taylor included in original, 1928 trust document).
75. See id. (noting, during 1930 amendment of trust document, Taylor’s acknowledgement of new bank entity as corporate trustee).
76. See Edward Winslow Taylor, Intervivos Tr., No. 132702, 2014 WL
12746880, at *1 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 18, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Tr. Under Agreement
of Taylor, 124 A.3d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), rev’d, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017)
(describing general purpose of Taylor Trust).
77. See id. (quoting 9/4/13 Elise Carr Petition, Ex. C (9/25/30 Trust Amendment, ¶ 3(a))) (describing trustee duties and powers as designated in Taylor Trust
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made the trust irrevocable and had it set to terminate in 2028, 100 years
after its creation.78 During her lifetime, Anna Taylor Wallace retained the
power to designate who the trust’s beneficiary would be after her death;
she later utilized that power to name her son, Frank R. Wallace, Jr., as
successor beneficiary.79 After Frank Wallace’s death in 2008, his four children became the trust’s beneficiaries.80 In 2009, Wells Fargo became corporate trustee of the Taylor Trust, and it shortly thereafter requested to
split the trust into four separate trusts, of equal value, for the four
beneficiaries.81
After Wells Fargo assumed the role of corporate trustee, some of the
trust’s beneficiaries petitioned the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County
and requested to modify the trust.82 The Taylor Trust beneficiaries based
their petition on Section 7740.1 of Pennsylvania’s UTA (the general trust
modification section), rather than on the more specific trustee removal
provision found in Section 7766.83 While the beneficiaries sought to add
various paragraphs to the trust document, the controversial change at the
heart of Taylor was the beneficiaries’ request to include a portability provision that would give the beneficiaries the power to replace Wells Fargo
document). Specifically, the trust document directed the corporate trustee to distribute the “net income . . . ‘at convenient times’ during [her life].” See id. (outlining specific language in Taylor Trust document that gave corporate trustee broad
power to distribute trust income to trust beneficiary).
78. See id. (noting that trust terminates in 2028). Taylor also allowed the trust
to terminate before its 100-year expiration date if twenty years had passed after the
death of the last survivor of Anna Taylor Wallace. See id. (describing alternate trust
termination device if Anna Taylor Wallace had no living survivors before 2028).
79. See id. (describing Anna Taylor Wallace’s power to choose successor beneficiary and her choice to name her son, Frank R. Wallace, Jr.).
80. See id. at *2 (describing trust developments in twenty-first century, including Frank Wallace’s four children becoming Taylor Trust beneficiaries after his
death).
81. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Pa. 2017) (identifying Wells Fargo as new Taylor Trust trustee and describing Wells Fargo’s request to split Taylor Trust into quarters, all of equal value); Taylor, 2014 WL
12746880, at *2 (describing Taylor Trust split, as requested by Wells Fargo). Wells
Fargo petitioned the court to split the Taylor Trust under the authority of 20 Pa.
C.S.A. Section 7740.7(b). See Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *2 (describing statutory
authority to split Taylor Trust). At the time of subdivision, the Taylor Trust was
worth 1.8 million dollars. See id. (citing 9/4/13 Elise Carr Petition, ¶¶ 2–12) (stating value of trust at time of subdivision).
82. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1151 (presenting actions of some Taylor Trust beneficiaries that began trust modification controversy).
83. See id. (describing alleged statutory authority beneficiaries relied on when
they petitioned Orphans’ Court to modify Taylor Trust). The Orphans’ Court
noted that the beneficiaries could not rely on Section 7740.1(a), but rather had to
rely on 7740.1(d) because of two general reasons: (1) the Taylor Trust settlor had
died, and (2) one of the Taylor Trust beneficiaries did not join the remaining
three in petitioning the Orphans’ Court. See Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *4
(commenting on limited avenues of relief under Section 7740.1 because settlor
had died and not all beneficiaries consented to trust modification).
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with a new corporate trustee of their choosing.84 Moreover, the beneficiaries only sought to amend the trust and did not indicate in their petition that they planned to immediately remove Wells Fargo as corporate
trustee if the court granted their request.85
Wells Fargo opposed the removal petition and argued that the beneficiaries’ reliance on Section 7740.1 was misguided and that Section 7766
exclusively controls trustee removal.86 The beneficiaries countered, arguing that Section 7740.1 allows general modification of a trust, which includes modifying a trust to include a portability provision.87 In 2014, the
Philadelphia Orphans’ Court ruled that the beneficiaries’ attempted use
of Section 7740.1 was barred due to Section 7766, which exclusively controls trustee removal.88
84. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1151 (describing Taylor Trust document changes
sought by beneficiaries); see also Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *4 (“In essence, the
three beneficiaries seek to modify the Taylor Trust agreement so that by consent of
the beneficiaries—alone—without any court petition or approval, a corporate trustee may be removed.”). Specifically, the three beneficiaries petitioned the court to
add four new paragraphs: (1) detailing notice requirements for trustee removal
and voting requirements for election of a substitute corporate trustee; (2) allowing
for a majority of current income beneficiaries to remove the corporate trustee,
without cause; (3) stating that if the power in paragraph two is exercised, the new
corporate trustee will be chosen by the trustees who decided to remove the previous trustee, and the new corporate trustee will be located in Pennsylvania; and (4)
clarifying that any reference to “Trust” includes any trust that exists as a result of a
subdivision of the original Taylor Trust. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1151–52 (quoting
Petition to Modify Trust Agreement, 9/4/2013, ¶ 24) (including exact language of
trust modifications three Taylor Trust beneficiaries sought to include in trust
document).
85. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1152 (noting that beneficiaries did not seek to immediately remove Wells Fargo as corporate trustee if modification provision were
granted).
86. See id. (describing Wells Fargo’s arguments against allowing modification
of Taylor Trust); Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *5 (describing Wells Fargo’s specific arguments to Orphans’ Court).
87. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1152 (describing beneficiaries’ arguments in support of their proposed Taylor Trust document modifications).
88. See Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *7 (holding that beneficiaries could not
use Section 7740.1(d) to amend trust document to include trustee removal provision). In its reasoning, the Orphans’ Court noted from the outset that the beneficiaries’ use of Section 7740.1 was not a “home run,” addressing both the lack of
unanimous consent of all the beneficiaries (only three of the four Taylor Trust
beneficiaries petitioned the court) and phrasing in Section 7740.1 that “opens the
door to Wells Fargo’s compelling arguments.” See id. at *5 (introducing trust modification issue and suggesting that its solution is not clear-cut). The Orphans’
Court defended its holding that there was latent ambiguity regarding which section controlled trust modification. See id. (explaining why court found that Pennsylvania law was ambiguous as to whether Section 7740.1 could apply to trustee
removal). In holding this, the court noted that: (1) the beneficiaries state that use
of 7740.1 will protect the interest of all beneficiaries, but they do not explain how;
and (2) Section 7740.1 refers to “this section,” which could very well refer to Section 7766 and not to 7740.1. See id. (quoting 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7740.1(d)(1) (West 2006)) (providing reasons why court does not see beneficiaries’ argument as a “home run”). In its reasoning, the Orphans’ Court both
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The beneficiaries appealed to Pennsylvania’s Superior Court, which
reversed the Orphans’ Court decision and found that the beneficiaries
could use Section 7740.1 to modify the Taylor Trust to include a portability provision.89 In rejecting the Orphans’ Court opinion, the Superior
Court identified three main errors: (1) the court’s premise that a petition
to modify the trust was the equivalent of removing Wells Fargo as a trustee;
(2) the court’s holding that there was ambiguity in Pennsylvania’s trust
statute; and, related to number two, (3) the court’s reliance on UTC comments to aid in interpreting UTA statutes.90 Wells Fargo then appealed
the Superior Court’s decision and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recognized that Pennsylvania’s UTA was based off the UTC and conceded that its
enactment in the early twenty-first century represented an expansion on beneficiaries’ ability to remove a trustee. See id. at *6 (quoting In re McKinney, 67 A.3d
824, 832, n.12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)) (noting close relationship between Uniform
Trust Code and Pennsylvania’s trust statute). However, this expanded ability did
not become unlimited, and the Orphans’ Court determined that because an ambiguity existed between the applicability of 7740.1 and 7766, the more specific Section 7766 should exclusively control trustee removal. See id. at *6 (citing 20 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7701) (holding that ambiguity in Pennsylvania trust
law exists regarding what section controls trustee removal); see also id. (holding
that when there is ambiguity between two statutory provisions, more specific provision controls).
89. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 124 A.3d 334, 335–37 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015), rev’d, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that case was on appeal from
Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County and reversing that court’s decision). The
court laid out the two issues on review as whether the Orphans’ Court decision
that Section 7740.1 “must yield” to Section 7766 regarding the addition of a portability provision was correct, and whether the Orphans’ Court erred by “derogat[ing] . . . well-settled principles of statutory constriction . . . [by] overid[ing] the
clear and unambiguous text of the trust modification provisions of [Section
7740.1]?” See id. at 336–37 (explaining issues upon appeal to Superior Court).
90. See id. at 341–42 (outlining three reasons why Orphans’ Court erred in
denying beneficiaries’ petition to modify Taylor Trust). The Superior Court reasoned that because no ambiguity existed between Sections 7740.1 and 7766, the
beneficiaries could utilize Section 7740.1—and 7740.1 alone—to modify the Taylor Trust to include the portability provision. See id. at 341 (holding that because
of lack of ambiguity, plain reading of Section 7744.1 allows modification of Taylor
Trust). Perhaps a sign that this particular fight was not over, Judge Platt of the
Superior Court dissented and argued that there is indeed a conflict between the
two sections, and thus, (akin to the reasoning of the Orphans’ Court) the more
specific 7766 should exclusively apply. See id. at 342–43 (Platt, J., dissenting) (arguing that general Orphans’ Court reasoning was correct and that ambiguity between Sections 7766 and 7740.1 requires exclusive application of Section 7766 to
trust modification to add portability provision). Judge Platt also noted, in addition
to his determination of ambiguity within the statute, that the Pennsylvania Legislature “had the opportunity to expand the grounds for removal of a corporate trustee . . . and declined to do so.” See id. at 343 (noting that Pennsylvania
Legislature’s adoption of UTC did not include broad corporate trustee removal
provisions). In addition, Judge Platt criticized the majority’s “false premise argument” (that is, the addition of a portability provision equals trustee removal) and
stated that the majority’s rejection of this premise “eviscerate[s]” Section 7766 for
any kind of trustee removal. See id. at 343 (arguing that premise declared “false” by
majority indeed exists and its rejection results in total nullification of Section 7766
for trustee removal).
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granted review, ultimately overturning the Superior Court’s decision and
holding that the Taylor beneficiaries could not use Section 7740.1 to modify the trust to add a portability provision.91
IV. OPTING NOT TO UPDATE: SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DECLINES ADOPTING THE VIEW THAT WOULD EXPAND
BENEFICIARIES’ ABILITY TO REMOVE A TRUSTEE
Taylor was an issue of first impression for the Orphans’ Court, with
the case centering on the Taylor beneficiaries’ ability to modify an irrevocable trust to include a provision that would allow removal of the trust’s
corporate trustee.92 Specifically, Taylor examined the tension between two
provisions in Pennsylvania’s trust law, Sections 7740.1 (general provision
regarding trust modification) and 7766 (specific provision regarding trustee removal).93 On appeal, Wells Fargo criticized the Superior Court’s
decision by claiming that the court refused to “apply basic principles of
statutory construction.”94 The Taylor beneficiaries countered, unsurprisingly, that modification of the Taylor Trust should be permitted because:
(1) they should have the chance to place their older trust “on the same
footing” as modern trusts; (2) the banking industry has changed significantly since 1928; and (3) other states that adopted the UTC specifically
designated their trustee removal provision as the exclusive provision to
91. See In re Taylor, 134 A.3d 447, 448 (Pa. 2016) (granting review on issue of
“whether the Superior Court erred in holding that trust beneficiaries may circumvent the requirements for removal of a trustee in Section 7766 of the Trust Act . . .
by amending the trust under [section 7740.1].”); Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1149 (explaining that case is on appeal from Superior Court and holding that Superior Court
erred in its analysis of whether Section 7740.1 can be used, alone, to modify Taylor
Trust to include portability provision).
92. See Taylor, 2014 WL 12746880, at *1 (explaining that analysis of interplay
between Sections 7766 and 7740.1 was issue of first impression for Pennsylvania
courts).
93. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1154–55 (describing problem before court as having to decide which statutory provision can be used to modify Taylor Trust to add
portability provision). For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s trust law and more specifically, Sections 7740.1 and 7766 of the UTA, see supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
94. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1153–54 (describing Wells Fargo’s arguments that
Superior Court failed to apply basic canons of statutory interpretation when it
found for Taylor beneficiaries). Wells Fargo saw an “obvious inconsistency” between Sections 7740.1 and 7766 and argued that if its decision was to be upheld,
“beneficiaries seeking to remove trustees will no longer resort to Section
7766 . . . .” See id. at 1153 (describing Wells Fargo’s articulation of Superior
Court’s alleged main error and effect of that error). In addition, Wells Fargo emphasized Pennsylvania’s history of great deference shown to settlors of trusts and
that when Pennsylvania enacted the UTA (in 2006) it rejected a proposed provision that would have allowed removal of a trustee based on the agreement of all
the trust’s beneficiaries. See id. at 1154 (outlining Wells Fargo’s arguments that
general Pennsylvania trust law history and rejection of proposed provision in 2006
supports contention that trust beneficiaries should not hold broad trustee removal
power).
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govern trustee removal, something that the Pennsylvania legislature did
not do.95 Amidst the noise of the various arguments set forth by both
parties, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s task was rather straightforward: examine the “interplay” between the two Pennsylvania trust statute
provisions and decide if Section 7740.1 allows the beneficiaries to amend
their trust to add a portability provision.96
The court prefaced its entire statutory analysis by explaining the constraints imposed by the Construction Act.97 Based upon the Construction
Act’s statutory “ground rules,” the Taylor court ultimately concluded that
the Superior Court’s decision to read Sections 7740.1 and 7766 as unrelated sections violated the Construction Act’s canons of interpretation.98
In coming to this conclusion, the court first determined that the UTA was
ambiguous as to whether Section 7740.1 and 7766 applied to trustee removal or whether just Section 7766 applied to trustee removal.99 Due to
this ambiguity, the court applied canons of statutory construction and
found that because Section 7766 more specifically addresses trustee removal, it exclusively governs that action.100 The court determined that
Sections 7766 and 7740.1 were ambiguous partly due to the opposing interpretations of the statute offered by Wells Fargo and the beneficiaries
were both reasonable.101
95. See id. (describing beneficiaries’ general arguments on appeal). The beneficiaries insisted that because the Taylor Trust was created in 1928 and did not
include modern trust provisions, they were “held captive to Wells Fargo as a derivative trustee.” See id. (relaying beneficiaries’ argument that, as policy matter, they
should be allowed to amend Taylor Trust to include portability provision). In the
same “lack-of-modernity” vein, the beneficiaries contended that Edward Winslow
Taylor, in 1928, was alive during a time in which the character of the banking
industry was dramatically different and that he could not have foreseen the various
changes that it would undergo. See id. (highlighting beneficiaries’ arguments that
banking industry changed dramatically between 1928 and 21st century, something
Taylor Trust settlor did not anticipate). Lastly, the beneficiaries contended that
other states that adopted the UTC “expressly precluded modification to permit
portability,” and because Pennsylvania did not expressly prohibit this, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania should not “engage in judicial rewriting . . . to insert limitations that the legislature did not choose to include.” See id. (outlining beneficiaries’ final point that because Pennsylvania legislature did not expressly prohibit
modification to include portability provision, court should infer that it is allowed).
96. See id. at 1154–55 (describing main issue court was tasked to resolve upon
appeal).
97. See id. at 1155 (introducing Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act as
statutorily imposed guide to statutory interpretation).
98. See id. at 1155, 1161 (holding that Sections 7766 and 7740.1 must be read
together, as part of cohesive statute, and thus, Section 7766 must exclusively control trustee removal).
99. See id. at 1156 (holding that ambiguity exists in statute regarding which
provisions apply to trustee removal).
100. See id at 1158–61. For a discussion of the court’s statutory analysis of
Sections 7766 and 7740.1, see supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text, and see
infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
101. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1156 (citing Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d
1136, 1146 (Pa. 2014)) (“Because both interpretations plausibly give effect to the
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The court considered three general factors when concluding that Section 7766 exclusively applies to trustee removal: first, the UTA should be
interpreted such that it is comprised of harmonious provisions; second,
Pennsylvania has a history of limited trustee removal powers; and third,
the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to allow trustee removal
through Section 7740.1.102 The court also found that because the Pennsylvania legislature intended Sections 7766 and 7740.1 to be based off of
the UTC, official comments of the UTC applied to the corresponding
UTA sections.103 The court found that the drafters of the UTC—eviplain language of the two provisions, a latent ambiguity exists.” (citation omitted)).
The court explained in more detail that it found the UTA to be ambiguous because of three reasons: (1) the court “has repeatedly held that there is an ambiguity when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the relevant text;”
(2) “neither section contains any explicit language addressing the issue raised
here;” and (3) there is a lack of specific language in either section “with respect to
whether section 7740.1’s modification power extends to the modification of other
statutory provisions of the UTA.” See id. at 1155–56 (providing three reasons as to
why court found that Sections 7766 and 7740.1 are ambiguous regarding their
application to trustee removal by beneficiaries). For a discussion of the two parties’ differing interpretations of the applicability of Sections 7766 and 7740.1, see
supra notes 86–87, 94–95 and accompanying text.
102. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1157 (“A fundamental principle in statutory construction is that we must read statutory sections harmoniously.” (citing Commonwealth v. Office of Open Records, 103 A.3d 1276, 1284-85 (Pa. 2014)); id. at 1159
(describing how Pennsylvania legislature declined to adopt provision that would
allow beneficiaries of a trust to remove a trustee without any showing of trustee
being at fault); id. at 1158 (“Pennsylvania has a long history of strictly limiting the
removal and replacement of a trustee to circumstances in which an Orphans’
Court determines that good cause exists to do so.”). When holding that the UTA
should be interpreted as comprised of harmonious sections, the court noted that
one section of a statute should not nullify another section of the same statute. See
id. at 1157 (“Importantly, this presumption requires that statutory sections are not
to be construed in such a way that one section operates to nullify, exclude or cancel another, unless the statute expressly says so.”). The court found that allowing
Section 7740.1 to govern trustee removal would nullify “the effectiveness of
[S]ection 7766.” See id. (holding that one canon of statutory interpretation requires harmonious reading of various sections of statute, and thus Section 7740.1
cannot apply to trustee removal because it would nullify effects of 7766). The
court noted the “significant contrast” between the two sections, with Section
7740.1 requiring only the showing that the change would not violate a material
purpose of the trust, while Section 7766 requiring “substantial evidentiary hurdles”
like (among other requirements) proving there is some problem with the current
trustee. See id. 1157–58 (describing contrasting requirements of Sections 7740.1
and 7766).
103. See id. at 1160–61 (holding UTC comments apply to corresponding provisions in Pennsylvania’s UTA). The court concluded that the uniform law comments could apply to Pennsylvania’s law by first looking to the Construction Act,
which allows general legislative history to be used as an interpretive device, as long
as the text reigns supreme if there is a conflict between the two. See id. at 1159
(explaining allowed use of “comments or report” of drafting “commission, committee, association or other entity” to aid in interpreting statute (citation omitted)). The court continued to explain that the UTA explicitly states that “the
sections of the UTA that are substantially similar to their UTC counterparts are
indicated by a reference to the UTC section number in the UTA section headings”
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denced by the official comments—did not intend Section 7740.1 to encompass beneficiary modification of a trust to remove a trustee.104 All
these factors, taken together, allowed the court to come to the conclusion
that the Taylor beneficiaries could not use Section 7740.1 to modify the
Taylor Trust to add a portability provision.105
V.

NEW CENTURY, SAME PROBLEM: TAYLOR DECISION LIMITING TRUSTEE
REMOVAL TO SECTION 7766 OF UTA INVOKES SPIRIT OF
CLAFLIN AND RAISES CONCERNS REGARDING
PERPETUAL CORPORATE TRUSTEES

In Taylor, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the beneficiaries’ argument that Pennsylvania’s trust modification provision found
in Section 7740.1 could be used to bring about trustee removal via a portability provision.106 Notably, in a time when beneficiary powers over their
trusts have been expanding, the Taylor decision represents a bright-line
rule limiting beneficiaries’ power to remove their trustees.107 The glimand that UTC comments apply to UTA provisions as long as the two are similar.
See id. at 1159–60 (explaining test for applicability of UTC comments to Pennsylvania’s UTA provisions). The court found Section 7740.1 to contain a reference
to its UTC counterpart, and thus considered the UTC comment. See id. at 1160
(“The heading for section 7740.1 contains a reference to the corresponding UTC
section number (UTC 411), and we may thus consider the UTC’s Uniform Law
Comment as evidence of the General Assembly’s intent with respect to the proper
application and scope of section 7740.1.” (citation omitted)).
104. See id. at 1160–61 (holding that UTC comments, which apply to sections
of UTA that are based off UTC, indicate that Section 7740.1 was not meant to
allow for trustee removal). The UTC comment notes that the trustee removal provision (Section 706, or 7766 in Pennsylvania’s UTA) is the “exclusive provision on
removal of trustees.” See id. at 1160 (quoting 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7740.1 (West 2006)) (reciting UTC comment, in full, which explains that trustee
removal provision in UTC is exclusive avenue for trustee removal). After examining the uniform law comment, court became confident in its holding:
[L]egislative intent with respect to the interplay between sections 7740.1
and 7766 is clear—the scope of permissible amendments under section
7740.1 does not extend to modifications to add a portability clause permitting beneficiaries to remove and replace a trustee at their discretion;
instead, removal and replacement of a trustee is to be governed exclusively by section 7766.
See id. at 1160–61 (finding that UTC comments bolster holding that 7766 is exclusive provision for trustee removal).
105. See id. at 1161 (holding that Section 7740.1 cannot be used to modify
trust to add portability provision).
106. See id. at 1154 (explaining beneficiaries’ argument that Section 7740.1
(trust modification provision) can be utilized to add portability provision); id. at
1161 (holding that Section 7740.1 cannot be used to modify Taylor Trust to add
portability provision).
107. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 263 (explaining how powers of beneficiaries
to modify or terminate trusts has “significantly expanded” during twenty-first century); see also Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1161 (“Instead, as the UTC comment to section
7740.1 reflects, section 7766 of the UTA is the ‘exclusive provision regarding removal of trustees.’ ” (quoting 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.1 )).
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mer of hope offered by the favorable Superior Court decision was snuffed
out as the Taylor beneficiaries learned that they were confined within the
bounds of Section 7766 to remove their corporate trustee.108
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision to take this approach
reflects a more traditional interpretation of trust law—both in America
and in Pennsylvania—that emphasized limited beneficiary rights and high
respect for the settlor’s intent.109 In this new world of Pennsylvania trustee removal, further examination of Section 7766—to which trustee removal is now confined—shows how the internal provisions of that section
even further limit removal of corporate trustees with its “mergers exception.”110 The Taylor decision—taken in the context of this mergers exception—pointedly highlights concerns some scholars have regarding the
power perpetual corporate trustees have over much-less-powerful
beneficiaries.111
A.

Old Trustees Die Hard: Mergers Exception in Section 7766 Adds Extra
Layer of Protection for Corporate Trustees in Removal Petitions

As a practical matter, it is crucial for counsel of all Pennsylvania trust
beneficiaries to understand both that a new limitation on corporate trustee removal exists and that Section 7766 is now the exclusive avenue for
trustee removal.112 The Taylor beneficiaries’ goal was a lofty one, and had
they succeeded, Pennsylvania trust beneficiaries would have had significant power to remove their trustees.113 After Taylor, Pennsylvania trust
108. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 124 A.3d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015), rev’d, Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) (holding
that Orphan’s Court decision denying beneficiaries the ability to use Section
7740.1 to modify trust to add portability provision was in error).
109. See Chester, supra note 4, at 704 (noting how Claflin doctrine emphasized
settlor control, even after settlor’s death); Fogel, supra note 7, at 349 (explaining
that under Claflin test, “the overwhelming majority of beneficiaries are unsuccessful in their attempts to terminate or modify trusts”). For a discussion of the Taylor
court’s decision and its connection to older treatment of trust modification and
termination in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text, and
see infra notes 110–25 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion on the internal limitations of Section 7766, see supra
notes 56–57 and accompanying text, and see infra notes 112–25 and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion on concerns scholars have regarding corporate trustees
and their power over beneficiaries in irrevocable trusts, see infra notes 126–34 and
accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of Section 7766 and the limitations it imposes on beneficiaries wishing to remove their corporate trustees, see infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text.
113. See Edward Winslow Taylor, Intervivos Tr., No. 132702, 2014 WL
12746880, at *1, *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 18, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 124 A.3d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), rev’d, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017)
(“In essence, the three beneficiaries seek to modify the Taylor Trust agreement so
that by consent of the beneficiaries—alone—without any court petition or approval, a corporate trustee may be removed.”); see also Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1158
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beneficiaries, and their lawyers, must now operate within the much stricter
confines of Section 7766.114
Section 7740.1 would have allowed modification of an irrevocable
trust via divided beneficiary consent if the modification did not violate a
material purpose of the trust.115 Notably, the ease of modification or termination under this section liberalizes the requirements of the Claflin doctrine, such as not requiring unanimous beneficiary consent.116 Section
7766, by contrast, attaches various requirements before a court can sanction a removal of a trustee: finding that removal is in the best interests of
beneficiaries, finding a suitable alternative trustee, not violating the material purpose of the trust, and falling within one of four specific scenarios
outlined by the section.117
Three of the four specific scenarios that provide an avenue for trustee
removal under Section 7766 (Section 7766(b)(1)–(3)) require some showing of fault on the part of the trustee; however, the last scenario (Section
7766(b)(4)) stands apart in that it only requires a substantial change in
circumstances.118 In the context of corporate trustee removal (like the
fact-pattern in Taylor), the no-fault “substantial-change-of-circumstances”
requirement comes with a large caveat: the mergers exception.119 The
mergers exception specifically excludes mergers and reorganizations of
corporate trustees as constituting a substantial change of circumstances.120 The implications of this exception are large: Pennsylvania trust
beneficiaries with corporate trustees that have undergone various mergers
(noting that when analyzing both Sections 7740.1 and 7766, Section 7740.1 has
“no comparable evidentiary requirements”).
114. See Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1161 (holding that Section 7766 is exclusive provision for trustee removal in Pennsylvania).
115. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.1(b) (West 2006) (“A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all the beneficiaries only if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to
achieve any material purpose of the trust.”); see also Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1158 (noting that Section 7740.1 merely requires showing that modification is not inconsistent with material purpose of trust).
116. Compare Fogel, supra note 7, at 340 (explaining that Claflin test requires
unanimous beneficiary consent and “material purpose” test), with 20 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.1(b) (providing avenue for irrevocable trust modification
or termination with less-than-unanimous beneficiary consent).
117. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766(b) (listing requirements
petition to remove trustee must meet for court to be able to find that trustee removal is appropriate).
118. See id. (listing four avenues that, any of which if satisfied, would allow for
trustee removal, with last avenue standing apart because it does not require showing of fault on part of trustee). For the exact language of Section 7766, see supra
notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
119. See § 7766(b)(4) (limiting substantial change of circumstances avenue of
trustee removal with mergers exception).
120. See id. (“A corporate reorganization of an institutional trustee, including
a plan of merger or consolidation, is not itself a substantial change of circumstances.”); see also Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1150 (noting that Wells Fargo became corporate trustee of Taylor Trust after a “series of . . . mergers”).
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and acquisitions could be forced to continue dealing with that corporate
trustee unless they can prove one of the first three “fault provisions” found
in Section 7766 (b)(1)–(3).121 Thus, in a manner even more strict than
Claflin (which requires a material purpose analysis and unanimous beneficiary consent), in a scenario where a corporate trustee has experienced
many mergers and does not act in a way that would satisfy any of the fault
provisions, the court would not grant the removal.122 Theoretically, this
means that even if all beneficiaries consent and the removal of a corporate
trustee does not violate a material purpose of the trust (thus satisfying the
traditional Claflin test), the court could still deny removal.123 By largely
limiting corporate trustee removal to the first three fault provisions, Taylor
reflects old Pennsylvania trustee removal cases that demanded that the
beneficiaries come to court and show fault on the part of the trustee.124
In this light, one could interpret Taylor as adopting a trustee removal rule
that, in the spirit of Claflin—and actually stricter than Claflin—gives high
deference to the settlor’s original choice of trustee.125
121. See § 7766(b) (providing no other “no-fault” provision that could be used
as alternate to § 7766(b)(4) because of that section’s “mergers exception” that
would bar substantial change of circumstances argument just because corporate
trustee went through string of mergers).
122. See Fogel, supra note 7, at 340 (listing Claflin test, which does not include
showing of fault or problem/defect in trust document). But see In re McKinney, 67
A.3d 824, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (allowing removal of corporate trustee via
Section 7766(b)(4) substantial change of circumstances provision even though
corporate trustee had experience many mergers). Indeed, even the Claflin “material purpose” test may not be too high of a standard in the trustee removal context;
the case Matter of May C. Hogan Trust, out of South Dakota, suggested that switching from one trustee to another trustee who can perform the same administrative
duties as the other could not violate the Claflin material purpose test. See Chester
& Ziomek, supra note 5, at 261 (“By incorporating the Claflin standard, the Hogan
court implied a term that a switch of trustees would be possible if it did not violate
a material purpose of the settlor: one bank or another could perform the functions the settlor had in mind; the court, however, concluded that such an analysis
would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.” (footnotes omitted)).
123. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766(b) (requiring satisfaction
of one of four scenarios to satisfy trustee removal statute and successfully remove
trustee); see also Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 249 (noting that “absent a
breach of trust, current American trust law generally backs the banks in [trustee
removal] matters”). For a discussion of the Claflin test, see supra notes 41–45 and
accompanying text.
124. See In re Mathues’ Estate, 185 A. 768, 769–70 (Pa. 1936) (holding that
hostility between trustee and beneficiaries was provoked by trustee and therefore
did not warrant removal of trustee); In re Hurley’s Estate, 169 A. 81, 81–82 (Pa.
1933) (holding that “personal antagonism” not enough to warrant removal of trustee); In re Neafie’s Estate, 49 A. 129, 131–32 (Pa. 1901) (“If any personal annoyance or discomfort arises in her business relations with the trustee, it is to be
regretted; but, so far as the testimony discloses, he is not responsible for it, and
should not be punished by dismissal from his trust.”).
125. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 251 (defining Claflin doctrine as
requiring unanimous beneficiary consent and ensuring termination or modification of trust did not contravene material purpose of trust); see also Ausness, supra
note 4, at 239 (“Nevertheless, it is still fairly difficult to modify or terminate a trust
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Old Power Struggle: Taylor Decision Highlights Concerns Regarding Power
of Corporate Trustees Over Less Powerful Beneficiaries

Placing trustee removal beyond the scope of Section 7740.1 and
squarely within the confines of Section 7766, the Taylor decision implicates
what some scholars see as an unequal playing field between beneficiaries
and perpetual corporate trustees.126 These corporate trustees, endowed
with great power from an unchanging trust document, can be viewed as
intimidating and adept at winning legal proceedings that challenge their
trustee status.127 Perhaps most emblematic of this perceived imbalance,
in some instances corporate trustees have the right to use trust funds to
defend the trust against any legal proceeding, including those initiated by
the trust’s very own beneficiaries.128 Thus, because the mergers exception
largely makes the “fault provisions” of Section 7766 the only avenue of
relief, beneficiaries will have to decide whether they have the means and
energy to formally litigate against their corporate trustee to bring about its
desired removal.129
under the traditional regime.”); id. at 294 (explaining that settlor’s use trusts as a
way to exert control over property); Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 252 (noting that “[a]bsent authority in the trust instrument or a showing of breach of trust
by the trustee” the likelihood of trustee removal is low). Claflin is not without its
critics, and some have argued that the trust doctrine Claflin inspired may work
against the settlor’s wishes by limiting beneficiaries’ ability to control a trust made
specifically for their benefit. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 250 (“Thus, in
continuing to hold the settlor’s intent paramount under Claflin, American courts
and lawmakers are tying the hands of the beneficiaries, whose interests the settlor
was originally concerned with promoting.” (footnote omitted)).
126. For a discussion on commentary regarding the power dynamic between
corporate trustees and beneficiaries, see infra notes 127–140 and accompanying
text.
127. See Smith, supra note 5, at 573–76 (outlining difficulties beneficiaries can
face if they challenge corporate trustee in court). Smith outlines various ways in
which beneficiaries may find taking their corporate trustee to court intimidating
or futile, such as the great power corporate trustees have over trust resources, corporate trustees’ ability to “dictate administrative and dispositive policies” without
beneficiary consent, and practical difficulties of going to court, such as high legal
fees. See id. at 573–74 (describing reasons some beneficiaries may be apprehensive
initiating court proceeding to remove corporate trustee). In addition, beneficiaries may fear taking their claim to court purely because trust law is complicated.
See id. at 573 (“While trust law is commendable for its breadth, flexibility and attention to the wishes of settlors, often it is too complicated and lacking of ‘bright
lines’ for rigorous administration in practical situations, and as a result, much less
understandable to beneficiaries.”).
128. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 242 (describing case in which
beneficiary realized that in trustee removal case initiated by her, bank trustee was
able to use trust’s property to fund trustee’s defense); see also Smith, supra note 5,
at 574 (explaining how corporate trustee may retain expensive counsel to defend
trustee removal suit, and that that defense may very well be funded by trust
property).
129. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7766(b) (West 2006) (requiring
court approval to remove trustee).
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This problem of trustee-beneficiary inequality is even more potent in
older trust documents because they often include corporate trustees that
were chosen before dramatic changes in the banking industry (the Taylor
Trust was created in 1928).130 Decades ago, corporate trustees were
mostly local banking institutions who had trust departments not to make a
profit, but rather to develop the image that the bank was involved in its
community.131 Beneficiaries wielded greater power at that point in time
because if they were unsatisfied with their trustee, the local bank’s reputation could be damaged.132 Modern corporate trustees of older trust documents, by contrast, exist behind the protective barriers of largely nonmodifiable trusts when they should be competing in a competitive market.133 While evading this market competition, corporate trustees have
also morphed their trust departments from reputation-gaining devices,
with little regard for profit, to decidedly profit-driven enterprises.134
130. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Pa. 2017) (stating date of Taylor Trust creation); see also Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 250
(stating that settlor often named “hometown bank” as trustee with basis for decision being “a personal relationship” with such bank). As such, Chester and Ziomek argue that the various changes of the banking industry “may destroy both
this special relationship and undercut the settlor’s primary reason for selecting the
bank.” See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 250 (footnote omitted) (commenting on how bank mergers may “destroy” local character of bank that prompted
settlor to choose bank when creating trust). Newer trusts largely avoid the problem of unmodifiable trust documents by containing a removal clause that grant the
beneficiaries some measure of control over their trusts.” See Smith, supra note 5, at
578 (explaining how modern trusts differ from older trusts in context of trustee
removal powers).
131. See Smith, supra note 5, at 566 (explaining that before changes in banking industry, corporate banks had trust departments to “foster the image of the
bank as a caring institution and [to] assist in maintaining the lines of communication between old and potentially valuable future customers”).
132. See id. (explaining that if bank improperly administered trust and bank
trust beneficiaries were unsatisfied, word-of-mouth commentary throughout the
community could put corporate trustee in check).
133. See id. at 578 (arguing that “easing access to alternative corporate administration enhances competition . . . while discouraging corporate excess”). While
many beneficiaries feel frustrated with the performance of their corporate trustee
but helpless to do anything about it, corporate trustee competition could lower
fees and allow beneficiaries to “shop around.” See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5,
at 247 (“Because today’s banking industry is engaged in such large volumes of trust
asset transfers and sales from bank to bank, the Claflin doctrine seems too restrictive of beneficiaries’ rights to play the corporate fiduciary market.”). For example,
most beneficiaries do not have control over the fees that the corporate trustee sets.
See Smith, supra note 5, at 572 (noting that corporate trustees can raise rates on
beneficiaries even though beneficiaries lack ability to “seek[ ] more cost effective
administration”).
134. See Smith, supra note 5, at 567 (noting that one effect of development of
banking industry is “the transformation of the trust department into a major profit
center with an increasing demand that the corporate trustee show loyalty to client
and stockholder alike even though their interests are fundamentally in conflict”).
As the “business” of trust administration grew, trust funds became increasingly less
associated with the local bank. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 248 (“As
banks continue to merge, consolidate, and dissolve, trust funds are transferred
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Various solutions are proposed that attempt to balance the interests
of trust beneficiaries with the longstanding practice that the settlor’s decisions, as reflected in the trust’s language, should be respected.135 One
such solution premises all of trust law as derived from the principles of
contract law, thus affording beneficiaries some third-party rights as they
would under an implied term in an ordinary beneficiary contract.136 A
different solution envisions a new legislative framework that provides for a
series of “checks and balances” between corporate trustees and beneficiaries, such as mandatory disclosure rights, required beneficiary approval
over some trustee actions, and co-sharing of trust assets between the beneficiaries and the trustee.137
A reform specific to Pennsylvania—envisioned by Pennsylvania practitioner Timothy J. Holman in response to the Taylor decision—would
amend Pennsylvania’s UTA to allow beneficiaries to add a portability provision to their trust if the trust was created before 1985, the trust does not
specifically prohibit a portability clause, and the replacement trustee
meets certain qualifications.138 Holman hopes that this amendment
daily from bank to bank as part of the banking industry’s normal course of business.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, concerns arise when banks have to try to balance (if they can) the interest of the trust beneficiary and the bank’s shareholders.
See Smith, supra note 5, at 569 (explaining tension corporate bank trust departments face).
135. See generally Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 275 (noting that any reform to corporate trustee removal must try to strike a balance between respecting
settlor intent and allowing beneficiaries to exert some control over potentially underperforming corporate trustees). For a discussion of some proposed reforms,
see infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
136. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 5, at 274 (explaining contractual theory of trust law that would afford beneficiaries more rights to control trust document). Specifically, the contract theory states that the settlor and the corporate
trustee contract to benefit the beneficiary, and that agreement “carries an implied
term that the fiduciary shall administer the trust in the best interests of the beneficiaries.” See id. (describing how contractual theory would inject into agreement
between settlor and trustee a term that trust is in best interests of beneficiaries). In
addition, this “best interests” implied term would allow beneficiaries to amend
trust document if the change conforms with the traditional Claflin material purpose test. See id. (describing how under contract theory, beneficiaries would have
ability to remove trustee if such removal did not violate material purpose of trust);
id. at 267 (“This means that replacement of trustees and continuation of the trust,
even if not expressly stated, are generally contemplated in the original trust deal,
whether or not this deal is seen as having elements of a relational contract.” (footnote omitted)).
137. See Smith, supra note 5, at 573 (advocating for new trust legislation that
would restrain “leverage of a corporate trustee” through measures “such as
mandatory disclosure . . . rights[,] . . . provision for an individual co-trustee/trust
protector, a power of the beneficiaries to choose their own corporate trustee, provision within the instrument for beneficiary approval over certain [trustee] actions,
and . . . co-custody”).
138. See Timothy J. Holman, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Taylor Trust Opinion Requires a Legislative Fix, PHILA. BAR. ASS’N PROBATE AND TR. LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER, Oct. 2017, at 3, 3–4 (describing proposed amendment to “fix” negative
impact of Taylor decision). To prevent relentless trustee removal, the proposed
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would provide relief to “a specific subclass of trusts swept into the extraordinarily broad reach of [Taylor].”139 While these proposed reforms vary in
their scope and approach, they collectively highlight the growing chorus
of voices calling for beneficiaries—especially those of older trusts—to have
more power over corporate trustees than they presently possess.140
VI. FACING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE: AS PENNSYLVANIA PRACTITIONERS
GRAPPLE WITH LIMITED TRUSTEE REMOVAL POWERS, A RECENT
PENNSYLVANIA COURT CASE MAY PROVIDE AN
ALTERNATIVE AVENUE FOR RELIEF
While legislative reform or a comprehensive change in the way courts
view trust law may provide relief for beneficiaries in the long run, the effect of the Taylor decision is immediate and affects all of Pennsylvania.141
What, then, can beneficiaries of Pennsylvania trusts do to remove their
corporate trustee?142 While use of Section 7740.1 is no longer a viable
option to bring about removal of a corporate trustee, another case may
provide an alternate avenue of relief for some trustee removal petitions.143
In re McKinney, decided in 2013 by the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
caught the attention of Pennsylvania practitioners because it seemed to
make removal of corporate trustees easier under the no-fault provision of
Section 7766(b)(4).144 The case was praised for providing “a roadmap
amendment would only allow beneficiaries to remove a trustee under this section
once every five years. See id. at 4 (limiting beneficiaries’ ability to replace trustee to
once every five years).
139. See id. at 4 (explaining proposed UTA amendment and justifying it
through explanation of perceived overinclusion of trusts affected by Taylor
decision).
140. For a discussion of criticisms regarding power dynamic between corporate trustees and beneficiaries and the proposed reforms to fix this problem, see
supra notes 126–39 and accompanying text.
141. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1161 (Pa. 2017) (denying Taylor beneficiaries’ present petition to modify Taylor Trust via Section
7740.1 of UTA); see also Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM
PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.pacourts.us/courts/supreme-court/ [https://
OF
perma.cc/L36N-SG9A] (explaining that Supreme Court of Pennsylvania highest
court in state of Pennsylvania).
142. For a discussion of a potential solution to the set-back Taylor presents to
dissatisfied beneficiaries of corporate trustees, see infra notes 143–55 and accompanying text.
143. See In re McKinney, 67 A.3d 824, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (allowing
removal of corporate trustee via Section 7766(b)(4) substantial change of circumstances provision). For a discussion of the favorable door McKinney may open for
dissatisfied beneficiaries of corporate trustees, see infra notes 144–55 and accompanying text.
144. See Marshall, supra note 18 (explaining that “it is getting easier for beneficiaries to change the trustee” as result of McKinney decision); see also Avalli, supra
note 70 (noting that “balance of power” in “corporate trustee world” has swung
back towards beneficiaries as result of McKinney decision).
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and balanced standards for beneficiaries” hoping to remove an “unsatisfactory corporate [trustee].”145
Indeed, unsatisfied beneficiaries whose hopes were dashed that Section 7740.1, and its few standards, could apply to trustee removal may find
their next best hope in McKinney.146 McKinney suggests that Pennsylvania
courts are willing to add an asterisk after the mergers exception of Section
7766(b)(4), meaning that while the mergers exception still stands, a corporate trustee’s mergers and reorganizations can still play a part in the
court’s analysis of whether trustee removal is warranted.147 In McKinney,
the court specifically noted the corporate trustee’s change in personnel,
resulting from a “string of mergers,” when it decided that removal was
warranted.148 Specifically, the McKinney decision suggests that the mergers exception does not preclude consideration of a corporate trustee’s
mergers; rather, it means that a removal petition cannot stand on mergers
alone and requires at least a second factor.149 In McKinney, the out-ofstate move of the beneficiaries was the second factor that ultimately allowed the court to conclude that removal was warranted under Section
7740.1.150
Notably, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not expressly limit
this second factor to out-of-state moves.151 Eager beneficiaries may want
to try substituting another second factor, like the out-of-state move in McKinney, that could trigger a similar type of analysis by a Pennsylvania
court.152 However, basing a removal action on McKinney may be wading
out into unknown waters; the case was the first to examine this type of
issue in Pennsylvania, and it came out of the Superior Court, which is not
the highest court in Pennsylvania.153 The Taylor decision may very well be
145. See Allman & Walters, supra note 70 (arguing that McKinney balances
power between corporate trustees and beneficiaries and is “welcome relief to captive Pennsylvania trusts”).
146. For a discussion of McKinney and its potential liberalizing effect on nofault corporate trustee removal, see infra notes 147–55 and accompanying text.
147. See McKinney, 67 A.3d at 837 (noting that in its holding that removal is
warranted, mergers and reorganizations of McKinney’s corporate trustee can be
considered as factor in court’s analysis).
148. See id. at 836 (“After careful consideration, we find under the circumstances of this case that a string of mergers over several years, resulting in the loss
of trusted bank personnel, coupled with the movement of a family from Pennsylvania to Virginia, constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.”).
149. See id. (holding that substantial change of circumstances has occurred
because there was change in personnel as result of mergers “coupled” with out-ofstate move).
150. See id. (designating out-of-state move as one half of analysis that allowed
court to come to conclusion that substantial change of circumstances occurred).
151. See id. at 830–37 (not limiting substantial change of circumstances “second factor” to just out-of-state move).
152. See id. (granting beneficiaries’ removal petition).
153. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, supra note 141 (explaining hierarchy of Pennsylvania judicial system); see McKinney, 67 A.3d at 836 (noting that
there is lack of case law as to what constitutes substantial change of circumstances).
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a signal that Pennsylvania courts are unwilling to liberalize trustee removal
as seen in McKinney.154 Alternatively, Taylor could serve as a reminder that
beneficiaries’ best chance at no-fault removal already exists, and that to
have a future free of unsatisfactory corporate trustees, beneficiaries need
only look back to McKinney.155
154. See Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1161 (Pa. 2017) (declining to expand trust beneficiaries’ ability to remove trustee by limiting trustee
removal to Section 7766 of UTA). For a discussion of how the Taylor decision may
reflect older Pennsylvania treatment of trustee removal, see supra notes 106–25
and accompanying text.
155. See McKinney, 67 A.3d at 837 (allowing no-fault removal of corporate trustee). For a discussion of the potential effects of McKinney, see supra notes 141-54
and accompanying text.
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